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Assess and compare scarring effects of unemployment in Germany to other countries and to consider firm heterogeneity.

The author uses linked employer-employee data to analyze the effect of unemployment and its duration on future wages in Germany. Using administrative data on workers and firms in Germany and considering registered and unregistered unemployment episodes, the results show long-lasting wage losses caused by unemployment incidences. Furthermore, the estimations indicate that unemployment duration as well as selectivity into firms paying lower wages is of particular relevance for the explanation of wage penalties of re-employed workers.

Unemployment causes massive and persistent wage declines in the future, which depend on the unemployment duration. Furthermore, reduced options of unemployed workers and selectivity in firms contribute to a large part of unemployment scarring.

Findings are relevant for current debates on unemployment and can help design measures to avoid huge costs of unemployment.

This paper analyses long-term unemployment scarring by considering not only unemployment duration but also selectivity in firms and its effect on the scarring effect.

The paper aims at modelling a game‐theoretical framework that covers the basic mechanisms of lease contract negotiations while making allowance for relevant behavioural aspects.

Based on a review of literature about negotiation processes the work initially models, analyses, and solves lease contract negotiations as basic non‐cooperative game situations. It develops a game‐theoretical model based on the simple bi‐matrix normal form and the Rubinstein bargaining game while successively approximating real estate practice by integrating behavioural concepts.

On a conceptual level the work demonstrates that a game‐theoretical modelling of lease contract negotiations allows for a systematic structuring of the conflict situation between landlords and tenants. Different market situations that affect the perception of utility of the negotiating parties, as well as the consequences of mutual concessions and the creation of additional negotiation subjects that enhance the perceived contract utility can be taken into account by integrating simple mental models. On a practical level the paper shows that brokers' influence on the behavior of the negotiating partners can contribute to the efficiency of negotiation processes and the perceived contract utility. It identifies mutual concessions and the creation of incentives and additional negotiation subjects as possibilities to improve the attractiveness of a lease contract and to reach more beneficial contract provisions.

The paper offers a systematic examination of bargaining processes between landlords and potential tenants which can help professionals to understand lease contract negotiations as conflict situations and reach more profitable and satisfying results.